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Abstract
Supreme Audit Institutions 
(SAIs), such as Auditor Gener­
als and Court of Auditors, are 
considered to be a crucial link 
in the accountability chain be­
tween Parliament and govern­
ment. The value of the indepen­
dent audit lies both in the fact 
that the auditor is and is seen 
to be independent of the audit­
ed entity, and hence is able to 
carry out the audit free of any 
externally imposed constraints. 
The oversight of the SAI is also 
very important. In response 
to the question, “Who guards 
the guardians” posed by Foster 
(2001), the present paper ar­
gues a case for peer review of 
SAIs. This practice has already 
been voluntarily adopted by
some SAIs even though they 
are under no International Or­
ganizational of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) obli­
gation to do so. In advancing 
the argument for peer review 
of SAIs, the authors (a) review 
the literature pertaining to the 
oversight of SAIs; (b) discuss 
difficulties in the changing 
role of public sector auditing;
(c) consider arguments for the 
need to be proactive in order 
to avoid a credibility crisis in 
public sector auditing; and, fi­
nally, (d) draw on deterrence 
theory in order to advocate the 
introduction of Statutory Au­
dit Quality Assurance Review 
Panels.
Glossary
AG Auditor General
ASOSAI Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
INTOSAI International Organization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions
JCPA Joint Committee of Public Accountants
NAO National Audit Office
SAI Supreme Audit Institutions
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SAI s’ independence from other government institutions and 
afl democratic environment deserve particular emphasis..., 
is one of the permanent aims constantly pursued by INTO- 
SAI1 and its members.
Introduction
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have an important mis­
sion to accomplish - that of carrying out an audit of pub­
lic funds in an independent, accountable and professional 
manner. Such an audit, however, has been extended in re­
cent years beyond the financial audit. In the 1990s SAIs 
were expected to carry out a comprehensive audit (Gill and 
Cosserat, 1996) covering: (a) regularity audit, or otherwise 
known as financial audit, which consists of: attestation of 
the financial accountability and compliance of the public 
administration; and (b) performance auditing which entails 
the evaluation of economy, efficiency and effectiveness (i.e., 
the 3 E’s) of management of the government bodies.
Elcock (2000, p. 16) has argued, however, that the 3 E’s 
are “antagonistic to the interest of working-class people 
who seek greater equality and are particularly dependent on 
public services and welfare benefits”. In support of this, Sir 
Bourn (2000, p. 8) points out that the UI< value for money 
“examinations also now focus much more on outputs and 
outcomes rather than the processes involved in delivering 
them”. He goes on to say that the “public sector must be alive 
to such criticisms” as those relayed by Elcock.
After first assessing the current situation in Cyprus as far 
as oversight of the Auditor General is concerned, the paper 
goes on to develop a model of oversight of SAIs. The mod­
el draws both on the framework proposed by English and 
Guthrie (2000) as well as on the results of an examination 
carried out by the present author on the oversight of SAIs 
in twenty-one countries (Clark et al. 2007). Given the many
1. The International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) 
has provided an institutional framework for its 180 SAI member qualified 
organisations worldwide, for over 40 years.
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loopholes in the current legislation covering the local Audi­
tor General and the increased demands for accountability 
and oversight of SAIs internationally, particularly with re­
gard to recent pressure by INTOSAI to improve oversight, 
then such a model is long-awaited2. The paper should be of 
interest to practitioners and academics.
Before discussing the English and Guthrie (2000) frame­
work and its implications for the AG in Cyprus, it is impera­
tive that one looks at the different structures of SAIs and the 
different audits that may be performed.
The structure of supreme audit institutions varies. There 
are four types of SAIs:
(a) Courts with a judicial function: This means that the SAI 
has judicial powers to impose sanctions, fines, and penal­
ties on public servants who have been found to misman­
age government funds. There are six countries which 
can be grouped as such, and these are namely: Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, France and Belgium.
(b) Collegiate body without a judicial function - a feature of 
the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Euro­
pean Court of Auditors where the individuals appointed 
cannot impose sanctions.
(c) Independent audit office headed by an Auditor General 
- found in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and 
Cyprus, where the AG simply audits and identifies weak­
nesses and makes recommendations.
(d) Audit office headed by an Auditor General within the 
structure of the government - found in Finland. 
Furthermore, the type of audit varies between the differ­
ent countries. There are:
(a) A Priori Audit, i.e. an audit in advance of expenditure. 
This means that the public sector auditor checks the ex­
penditure before it is actually paid to ensure it is within 
the budget criteria being established. In Greece, for ex­
ample, all government expenditure is subject to a priori 
audit.
(b) A Posteriori Judicial, i.e. the system whereby the SAI au­
2. Exposure Draft (2002) Revision on Guideline 51 provides for external peer 
review.
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dits the annual accounts submitted. In some countries 
(e.g., Belgium and France) the SAI forms a judgment 
on whether the accountant has carried out his duties 
properly. In Greece the SAI “judges the liability of the 
individual responsible, who make up any deficit” (NAO,
2001, p. 20).
(c) A Posteriori Financial: A financial audit is conducted af­
ter the expense has been incurred and settled in full. All 
European Union SAIs carry out this type of audit.
(d) A Posteriori Performance: This type of audit is carried 
out after the expense has been incurred and also assesses 
the efficiency, effectiveness and economic implications 
of the transactions. All European Union SAIs, except for 
Greece, perform this audit (NAO, 2001, p. 20).
The current legislation in Cyprus pertaining to the Audi­
tor General (AG), (as amended on 12 July 2002) provides 
the Cypriot AG with the authority to carry out posteriori 
financial audits and posteriori performance audits. Whilst 
it is not enshrined in the constitution, the Auditor General 
carries out priori audits for such major projects as the con­
struction of government buildings. The Constitution does 
not provide for any oversight of the Auditor General nor 
does it provide it with any judicial powers like the Court of 
Auditors.
Oversight of SAIs: A Literature Review
The available literature on the oversight of SAIs is recent 
and limited in volume. The main work has been conducted 
in Australia by Barrett (1996), Mulgan (1997), English and 
Guthrie (2000), Favere-Marhese (2000) and DeMartinis and 
Clark (2003). A major stimulus for that work was the (1989 
and 1996) reports by the Joint Committee of Public Ac­
countants regarding the Independence of Auditors General. 
Mulgan (1997) acknowledged a model of accountability that 
comprises a number of complementary ‘agencies’, process­
es, and channels of accountability between the public and 
public servants. The four main processes of accountability 
comprise: reporting or accounting, information-seeking or
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investigation, assessment or verification, and direction and 
control. The literature also acknowledges the effectiveness 
of the accountability agencies, particularly in the context of 
the role of public sector audit, its independence, autonomy, 
funding and a comprehensive mandate.
In the context of this model, three issues surface that 
serve as a back-drop to this study. First, there is no reason 
to expect any one agency, channel or institution to fulfil all 
functions of public accountability. Second, there may be a 
perception that any channel may be considered ineffective 
or lacking power if it does not “direct and control” Mulgan 
(1997, p. 34) has pointed out that focus should be placed 
on whether their “scrutinising and auditing activities leads 
eventually to appropriate responses from government, pro­
voked if necessary by other channels of acceptability”. Third, 
although public sector audit is a necessity it is not a suffi­
cient agent for achieving at least the first three processes of 
accountability. Therefore, Mulgan (1997) argues that the key 
is to improve the scrutinising and auditing function of the 
auditor-general, as well as the other complementary chan­
nels including parliament and other officers such as the om­
budsman.
The recommendations of the Joint Committee on Public 
Accountants (JCPA, 1989; 1996) were used by English and 
Guthrie (2000) to develop a framework for the SAIs. It is 
worth noting here that no similar work has been conducted 
by the European Union,3 no directives have been issued or 
any US similar work carried out thus far to such an extent4. 
The model was initially tested by DeMartinis and Clark 
(2003) and Clark et al. (2007). DeMartinis and Clark identi­
fied weaknesses and deviance to the framework but no pol­
3. Drawing on correspondence with the Presidency, European Court of Au­
ditors (Mr. Dieter Bockem) "there is no EU - ‘acquis communautaire’ in 
the area of the setting-up of public external audit bodies. Therefore there 
are no EU obligations for any of the SAIs to be audited by another exter­
nal auditor and it is up to the national legislative bodies to define these 
requirements.”
4. The US Legislation under the Inspector General Act of 1978 and Amend­
ment of 1988 and 2001 Independence and Law Enforcement Amendment 
Act provides for oversight over their SAL
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icy implications or recommendations were proposed. The 
present paper will examine one of those issues addressed in 
the framework, that of oversight and how to overcome the 
said weaknesses/loopholes in the local legislation. Firstly, 
however, attention will focus on the structure of the English 
and Guthrie (2000) framework.
In the first part of the framework, the four accountability 
mechanisms available to parliament relate to:
(a) Scope of audit of the public sector (i.e., there should be 
no impediment to the auditor-general conducting finan­
cial statement and performance audits of all government 
entities);
(b) Powers of parliament in relation to audit (i.e., the par­
liament should have the power to request audits, have 
all audit reports tabled in parliament, and have a parlia­
mentary audit committee appoint and oversee the audi­
tor-general and his/her office);
(c) Funding should be determined by parliament (i.e., fund­
ing should be determined by parliament via input from 
parliamentary audit committee), and
(d) Oversight of the Auditor-General (i.e., an independent 
financial and performance audit of the Auditor-General’s 
office should be conducted regularly by an independent 
auditor who ought to be appointed by Parliament and re­
port to Parliament).
In the second part of the English and Guthrie (2000) 
framework, the powers or autonomy required by the Audi­
tor General to conduct audits relate to three issues:
(a) The mandate to perform audits (i.e., the SAI should per­
form financial statement and performance audits of all 
government agencies, authorities, companies and indi­
viduals);
(b) Independence from direction by the executive arm of 
government i.e., independence of the SAI should be en­
shrined in law and should include: (i) free of direction/ 
control from the executive arm of government, and the 
Auditor General ought to be reporting to parliament, 
(ii) have wide information gathering powers, (iii) be ap­
pointed by parliament, and appointed as an officer of 
parliament, and (iv) be able to determine the terms and
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conditions of employment of staff, and
(c) Funding (i.e., funding should be sufficient to enable the 
auditor-general to exercise effective mandate, and the 
funding should be recommended by the parliamentary 
audit committee).
Let us next take a close look at the AG in Cyprus, utilis­
ing the English and Guthrie (2000) framework.
1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Chapter II,
Article 115
The Current Cyprus Legislation provides for the following:
(a) Auditor-General (AG) and Deputy AG are appointed by 
the President,
(b) Appointment is until retirement age,
(c) AG’s salary is financed from consolidated funds, there­
fore the AG maintains his/her independence (i.e., re­
gardless of whether the budget is approved or not he/she 
receives his/her salary),
(d) The audit plan is not required to be submitted to Parlia­
ment,
(e) The audit report is tabled in Parliament by the President, 
and
(f) Audit staff is appointed based on public service require­
ments.
It is worth noting that in Cyprus:
(a) If one reads the annual local Auditor General’s report, 
the list of weaknesses identified is extensive. Entities that 
are funded by the government are not legally bound to 
comply with the AG’s recommendations. Therefore, it is 
impossible to be definitive about the effectiveness of the 
annual AG’s report in remedying the problems identi­
fied. However, the fact that such entities are audited may 
well mean that some taxpayers’ money is saved as a re­
sult of indirect pressure on them to comply with at least 
some of the AG’s recommendations. Such pressure may 
be exerted, for example, by the Ministry of Finance when 
discussing the budgets of government departments.
(b) Since the appointment of the Auditor General and the
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Deputy is made by the President, it is a Political Deci­
sion in which case the AG’s independence may be jeop­
ardised; 5
(c) Appointment of audit staff is based on the public service 
regulations, which in the case of Cyprus turns out, once 
again, to be a political decision, depending on which 
party is in power, and practices nepotism, and
(d) Given the budget for the AG department is currently ap­
proved by the Ministers before going to parliament, this 
could affect the extent of the audit testing.
Given that (a) the Cypriot Legislation is decades old, (b) 
both the Auditor General and the Deputy are political posi­
tions, (c) their annual report is presented first to the Presi­
dent and then to the Parliament, (d) the Auditor General has 
no judicial powers to impose any sanctions on those who 
mismanage public funds and, finally, (e) Parliament which 
reads the report has never imposed any fines, penalties or 
sanctions on those who mismanage public funds, one can­
not but conclude that there is a need for more regulation.
Therefore, to overcome, the above loopholes the answer 
should lies within regulation and adequate oversight. Foster 
(2001, p. 3) addresses an important question of “quis custo- 
diet ipsons custodes” or “who guards the guardians”, an issue 
that ought to be addressed by INTOSAI generally. Howev­
er, the individual SAI must take the initiative to ensure that 
their audit office has been reviewed by an independently ap­
pointed auditor. Foster, in his capacity as the Comptroller 
in the UK National Audit Office, argues that auditors in the 
public sector need to show the same openness “to challenge 
and the evaluation of [their] activities that [they] expect 
from [others].” He has argued that the auditors ought to be 
prepared to undertake themselves, every challenge that they 
impose on their clients.
This oversight should not only cover a financial audit but 
also a performance audit of the SAI. The report should be
5. Recent eruption of public servants’ corruption has indicated that the Au­
ditor General not only did not identify the cases but she stated that it was 
not her duty to find them, and one wonders whether she acted as a reason­
able auditor would have.
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sent directly to parliament and should be available to the 
funding institutions (e.g., European Union, World Bank etc). 
English and Guthrie (2000) recommend that the indepen­
dent auditor ought to be appointed by Parliament; however, 
in countries like Cyprus where the Auditor General and 
her Deputy are both appointed by the President, this could 
result in a political decision being made and the ‘indepen­
dent’ auditor would not, therefore, be so independent. The 
present author argues that the English and Guthrie (2000) 
model should be extended, by suggesting that there ought to 
be an audit committee independent of the government and 
parliament, incorporating amongst its members, represen­
tatives from all the political parties plus perhaps academics 
in the field of audit and corruption who would review the 
audit report from the independent auditor. This would be 
very important in countries like Cyprus where the SAI does 
not possess judicial powers and the Auditor General merely 
reports weaknesses and mismanagement of funds in the au­
dit report but no further action is then taken beyond that.
As far as the oversight of SAIs is concerned, an inter­
esting question is raised as to what relevant legislation cur­
rently exists in European and neighbouring countries. To 
answer this question, twenty-one SAIs 6 were selected from 
the INTOSAI web site. At the time of selection there were 
180 countries. The following two criteria were used to select 
the twenty-one countries:
(a) Different structures of SAIs were represented in the sam­
ple.
(b) Different types of audit were represented in the sample.
A check was made as to whether the legislation of those
countries provided for:
6. The SAIs selected were: Cyprus, Norway, Israel, Switzerland, Bulgaria, 
Czech-Republic, Denmark, Finland, Egypt, Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland, 
Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Greece and the Eu­
ropean Court of Auditors. The first thirteen were using the system of Au­
ditors General and the other eight are Court of Auditors. The sample tried 
to cover systems performing different type of audits, and an attempt was 
made to cover European Union member, accession countries as well as 
non European but close to Cyprus. The research was carried out in 2003.
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(a) An independent auditor to be appointed to oversee the 
SAI,
(b) Who appointed the independent auditor,
(c) Who the independent auditor reported to, and
(d) Whether the independent auditor performed a financial 
and/or a performance audit.
Based on the legislation reviewed, one-third of those 
twenty-one countries had oversight of the SAI. It is worth 
noting that in Ireland the independent auditor is appointed 
by the Auditor General, and one might surmise that his re­
port may not be so independent. On the basis of the avail­
able information, it is not possible to ascertain the effective­
ness of the work of the SAIs in countries where they are sub­
ject to oversight. Suffice it to point out that SAIs are indeed 
expected to undergo “external peer review” (Revision of the 
Exposure Draft of Guideline 51 (2002), European Imple­
menting Guidelines for the INTOSAI Auditing Standards).
Difficulties in the Changing Role of Public Sector Audit­
ing
Recent years have seen the public sector auditing being 
extended, due to: (a) criticisms on the public sector gener­
ally, (b) the increasing needs of the public sector, (c) pri­
vate funding, (d) privatisation, and (e) globalisation. Con­
sequently, there have been reports of public sector auditors 
carrying out probity auditing, integral auditing (Khemakhe, 
2001', forensic auditing (17th Commonwealth Auditor-Gen­
eral Conference, 2000), environmental auditing (Environ­
mental Auditing Moving Forward to XVII INTOSAI, 2001), 
over and above a priori audit, a posteriori judicial audit, a 
posteriori financial, and/or a posteriori performance (NAO,
2001) as well as more attention being paid to E-Government 
(Stuiveling, 2001). As public sector is globalised (i.e., as the 
number of countries receiving funds from the World Bank 
grows and more countries enter the European Union and 
are thus entitled to receive European funds), public sector 
auditing must remain totally independent, accountable and 
open to change.
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The difficulties which face public sector auditors can be 
conceptualised in a framework that comprises:
(a) Those difficulties public auditors have in common with 
private sector auditors, and
(b) A broad range of additional difficulties.
Thus the many difficulties facing public sector auditors 
(comparable to private sector auditors) in their role as ex­
ternal auditors (Krambia-Kapardis, 2001) are:
(a) Time pressures;
(b) Budget constraints;
(c) The scope of audit testing and inquiries may be inad­
equate;
(d) Management or government or even political parties 
may place restrictions on auditors;
(e) Auditors may fail to understand or identify related party 
transactions; and
(f) Auditors may rely on uncorroborated representations 
from management or government officials.
SAIs, however, face a number of additional difficulties 
by virtue of the fact that their role has been extended be­
yond the role of private auditors who, according to audit­
ing guidelines, only have to form an opinion on the truth 
and fairness of the financial statements. SAIs must audit not 
only the financial statements of government departments 
but also evaluate public servants or management in cases 
where governments have a controlling or even minority in­
terest in entities; in addition, they consider budget alloca­
tion, all within a political framework. Therefore, in addition 
to the difficulties in common with private sector auditors, 
SAIs have further difficulties to consider. These include:
(a) Given the extension of their duties, do they have the ex­
pertise in such a wide area?
(b) Do they have the funds available to carry out such an 
extension of audit services?
(c) Auditors General and Court of Auditors have a different 
degree of jurisdiction and power, can their effectiveness 
be compared?
(d) Staffs in some countries are appointed by the normal 
procedures of the civil service concerned in the relevant 
country. Such procedures involve political decisions by
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the “who-you-know” rather than the “what-you-know” 
process. Therefore, can the individuals who are ap­
pointed be totally independent when they come to audit 
departments or individuals known to them, who have 
helped them to acquire their position? After all it is the 
audit staff who conduct the audit and the Auditors Gen­
eral who basically sign the reports.
(e) Some countries have legislation that is decades old. 
Whilst in many countries auditing has changed over 
time, the legislation or the rules governing the SAI in 
some countries is anachronistic and leaves the SAI open 
to criticism.
(f) Fraud in the public sector is growing as is the case in the 
private sector. Fraudsters are becoming smarter, and so 
should auditors. For example, Krambia-Kapardis (2001) 
has suggested that auditors should improve their knowl­
edge of the aetiology of fraud and fraud indicators by 
drawing on relevant knowledge in other disciplines such 
as criminology, sociology and psychology.
(g) More and more public departments are privatised and 
the funds received are left unaccountable
(h) As Beekman (2000) outlines, there is: growing competi­
tion within the public sector, downsizing of the central 
government and organisations, growing importance of 
national interests in international development projects 
and a need to improve the coordination of international 
assistance projects. The right framework should, there­
fore, be introduced to avoid certain SAIs gaining a com­
petitive advantage over others.
Time to be Proactive Rather Than Wait for the Crisis
In view of the above difficulties, the public sector will, in 
due course, face a credibility crisis, similar to the one faced 
by the private sector in the middle of 1990s. Public sector 
auditors should not wait until faced with a credibility crisis 
before reacting (as their counterparts did in the private sec­
tor). In an attempt to avoid co-regulation (regulation by the 
governing body), the accounting profession, in Australia for
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example, decided to self regulate. According to Grabosky 
(1990),
“self-regulation or delegated regulatory tasks have 
emerged as complementary, if not alternatives to gov­
ernment regulatory oversight. The devolution of regu­
latory control responsibilities to independent profes­
sionals appears increasingly common” (pp. 76-77).
Self-regulation has been a clear objective of the account­
ing profession (Grice, 1993:17) and the European Commis­
sion (see EU press release, 16 March 2004 which proposes 
that a Public Oversight Board ought to be set at a national 
level in an attempt to strengthen the regulatory framework. 
Obviously self -regulation is better than co-regulation but, 
if no self-regulation exists, then co-regulation is inevitable. 
Unless the public sector auditors are regulated, then oth­
ers will endeavour to do that for them. The present authors 
maintain that self-regulation of (a) private sector auditors 
and (b) the SAI of a country should take the form of peer re­
views or accept the recommendation of the above proposal 
at the national level for (a) and international level for (b). The 
main justification for the peer review advocated (see below 
for details) is that it will significantly increase the quality of 
the audits performed because there will be a risk that the 
public auditors or the SAIs involved will face consequences 
if found to be lacking. The consequences proposed for pub­
lic auditors (see below for details) include, in the first in­
stance, having to implement recommended improvements 
to procedures they use within a certain period of time and, 
if they fail to comply, being reported to «higher authorities» 
and having to face the consequences (see below) of being 
reported.
The Reasons for Regulation
In the light of the difficulties which face public sector audi­
tors together with the fact that most SAIs do not possess 
judicial powers, there is a need for the oversight of SAIs to
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ensure that the funds utilised by the Government on SAIs 
are used in an economic, effective and efficient manner. A 
number of arguments can be presented for the oversight 
proposed:
(a) The public want to be informed as to how the Auditor 
General’s budget is used each year.
(b) Funding Institutions, like the World Bank or even the 
European Union, need to ensure that its funds are allo­
cated as initially proposed. And finally,
(c) In countries like Cyprus where the Auditor General is 
appointed by the President, it is vital that the opposition 
ensures that the Auditor General does not cover-up any 
mismanagement of funds by the Governing Party. 
Regarding the question of who is to audit the SAIs, Thor-
darsson (2000) is of the view that, “private audit firms [are] 
considered less appropriate for the review because they do 
not normally possess the specialised knowledge of govern­
mental affairs needed to audit an SAI’s performance”. An al­
ternative could be the peer review initiated by the Icelandic 
National Audit Office (NAO). As Thordarsson outlines, the 
UK NAO office was invited by Iceland to carry out a review 
of this type, on the basis that such an audit office has the in­
ternational reputation and expertise in working with audit 
entities in countries around the world. The final report was 
published and submitted to Parliament. The UK Comptrol­
ler “stated that the benefits of a peer review can be mutual” 
(Thordasson, 2000). Other countries may well decide to 
copy the example set by Iceland. In an attempt to improve 
further the peer review process, a model of Statutory Audit 
Quality Assurance Review Panels is proposed below.
Making self-regulation effective
In order for self-regulation to be successful one can draw 
on relevant knowledge within criminology, especially deter­
rence theory (Kapardis and Kapardis, 1995). The concept of 
deterrence was put forward by Bentham (1789). To ‘deter’ 
means discouraging someone from behaving in a particular 
manner through fear of consequences (Walker, 1991). De­
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terrence theory assumes that human beings are rational and 
weigh up the pros and cons when deciding to do or not to 
do something. Furthermore, for a measure to be an effec­
tive deterrent, it is held that (a) there should be a high risk 
(as perceived by the culprit) of being found out, and (b) the 
misbehaviour needs to be punished severely enough in or­
der to discourage the individual concerned from repeating 
the misbehaviour and/or others who contemplate commit­
ting the same deed. Both elements proiposed by deterrence 
theory must be present for the existence of a sanction to be 
an effective deterrent Of course, it is also imperative that a 
sanction is considered punitive enough from the point of 
view of the person misbehaving. In the context of public au­
ditors in a particular country or a country’s SAI, being ‘sti- 
gamatised’ by being reported, this paper argues, is punitive 
and, consequently, a sanction that could deter.
It should be noted in this context that, as indicated 
above, very few SAIs (e.g., Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin­
land, Malta) are audited by an independent auditor who is a 
private auditor employed by the same body that appointed 
the Auditor General (i.e., the Parliament) and whose report 
is submitted to Parliament (English and Guthrie, 2000). In 
the absence of data regarding the effectiveness of auditing 
SAIs by independent auditors, no conclusions can be drawn. 
Drawing on deterrence theory, it is argued that if the risk of 
being found to be ineffective is satisfactorily high and the 
severity of the likely sanction is also high, then peer reviews 
of public auditors and the SAI within a given country will be 
effective.
The Proposed Statutory Audit Quality Assurance Re­
view Panels (SAQARP) Model
The aim of such a review would be to ensure that the stan­
dards issued by the Auditing Standards Committee at the 
XIVth Congress of INTOSAI in 1992 in Washington, D.C., 
United States, as amended by the XVth Congress of INTO­
SAI 1995 in Cairo, Egypt are adhered to. As provided in the 
INTOSAI web site these standards are:
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(a) Basic Postulates in Government Auditing;
(b) The General Standards in Government Auditing (Inde­
pendence, Competence, Due Care, Other General Stan­
dards for SAIs);
(c) The Field Standards in Government Auditing (Planning, 
Supervision, Review, Study and Evaluation of Internal 
Control, Compliance with Applicable Laws and Regula­
tions, Audit Evidence, Analysis of Financial Statements); 
and
(d) Reporting Standards in Government Auditing.
Using the philosophy behind the peer reviews that will 
be carried out on the various accounting bodies, the idea of 
a quality assurance review being carried out by professional 
accounting bodies all over the world (e.g., Institute of Char­
tered Accountants of Australia, Australian Society of CPAs 
etc.), and the framework behind Sigma’s Guidelines and rec­
ommendations for self-assessment and the above standards 
provided by INTOSAI, the present author recommends the 
following (see Diagram 1 below):
(a) A number of Review Panels (similar to audit teams) 
should be introduced consisting of auditors from all 
the SAI members of INTOSAI. Members of the panels 
should be on a rotational basis and as representative as 
possible, taking into consideration cultural, religious and 
language barriers, the economies of the member states, 
the balance of power, the structure and size of the legis­
latures as well as geographical locations, and more im­
portantly the structure of the Supreme Audit Institution,
i.e. whether an Auditor General or a Court of Auditors.
(b) Such a review should be financed by the SAI under re­
view. The report could be used to prove to INTOSAI, 
funding institutions and the country’s Parliament that 
the SAI is independent, accountable and maintains a 
high standard of work, as expected by INTOSAI. Thus, 
it is in each country’s interest to ensure that it has been 
reviewed and has received a clean bill of health.
(c) The purpose for such a review will be to ensure: (i) all 
members of the panel benefit, rather than just one coun­
try as has been the case in the Iceland - UK review, (ii) 
have an educational as well as a disciplinary approach.
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As far as the educational aim is concerned, the Review 
Panel may identify that a certain country, for example, 
does not comply with a certain standard (e.g., supervi­
sion); it may then recommend that all the members of 
that SAI attend seminars on the certain audit standard. 
If the said individuals fail to comply with the recommen­
dations, they will face disciplinary action and, in extreme 
situations, the country’s SAI may cease to be a member 
of INTOSAI, perhaps jeopardising funding to the rel­
evant country from the World Bank or the European 
Union etc.
(d) Where significant weaknesses have been identified in the 
procedures being followed then the SAI being reviewed 
should be given guidance and recommendations to im­
prove its system within a time limit before it is reviewed 
again. Should the SAI not follow up the recommenda­
tions, INTOSAI, funding institutions and other relevant 
parties should be notified. For the countries eager to join 
the European Union and/or receive European funding, 
such funding should cease until the recommendations 
have been enforced.
(e) The chairperson of the review panel should be a partner 
of a private audit firm, and each team should have a rep­
resentative from each of the Big 4 firms but not from the 
same country as the SAI being audited. The reason for 
this is to ensure that the public sector auditors are not 
compromised in any way.
(f) Each country should have an independent audit com­
mittee made up of individuals from different political 
ideologies and totally independent of the government 
and, in the case of the European Union, EU decisions. 
In addition to a country’s Parliament this audit commit­
tee, ought to be receiving the final audit report from the 
SAQARP. A summary of the report should also be pub­
lished in the International Journal of Government Au­
diting.
Diagram 1 illustrates that the national Parliament should
appoint the Auditor General/ Court of Auditors and the Au­
dit committee. INTOSAI should appoint the members of
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Diagram 1
SAQARP and SAQARP should report to INTOSAI via its 
journal and to the National Audit Committee
Conclusions
Bhalakula has argued that the five essential characteristics of 
good governance in the public sector are: “rule of law, trans­
parency, participation, accountability, effectiveness and ef­
ficiency” (ASOSAI Assembly)7. If good governance is to be 
addressed, one answer is SAQARP, the model proposed.
Some may argue that this is costly for the hosting coun­
try. However, members of the panel will be paid and, there­
fore, their country’s SAI will benefit, if not financially, at 
least educationally, hence the benefit will outweigh the cost 
in the long run. It is an improvement over selecting a private 
auditor, or a particular SAI. INTOSAI ensures its members 
maintain a high standard of work and comply with the audit­
ing standards. It is an extension to Sigma’s work and funding 
institutions and hosting governments also know how effec­
tive, accountable and independent the SAI has been.
7. ASOSAI Assembly and Symposium. Cited in ASOSAI Assembly Ad­
dresses Governance Issues, International Journal of Government Auditing, 
(2001) Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 8-10.
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